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Air traffic systems have long relied on automated short-term conflict prediction 
algorithms to warn controllers of impending conflicts (losses of separation).  The complexity 
of terminal airspace has proven difficult for such systems as it often leads to excessive false 
alerts. Thus, the legacy system, called Conflict Alert, which provides short-term alerts in 
both en-route and terminal airspace currently, is often inhibited or degraded in areas where 
frequent false alerts occur, even though the alerts are provided only when an aircraft is in 
dangerous proximity of other aircraft. This research investigates how a minimal level of 
flight intent information may be used to improve short-term conflict detection in terminal 
airspace such that it can be used by the controller to maintain legal aircraft separation. The 
flight intent information includes a site-specific nominal arrival route and inferred altitude 
clearances in addition to the flight plan that includes the RNAV (Area Navigation) departure 
route. A new tactical conflict detection algorithm is proposed, which uses a single analytic 
trajectory, determined by the flight intent and the current state information of the aircraft, 
and includes a complex set of current, dynamic separation standards for terminal airspace 
to define losses of separation. The new algorithm is compared with an algorithm that 
imitates a known en-route algorithm and another that imitates Conflict Alert by analysis of 
false-alert rate and alert lead time with recent real-world data of arrival and departure 
operations and a large set of operational error cases from Dallas/Fort Worth TRACON 
(Terminal Radar Approach Control). The new algorithm yielded a false-alert rate of two per 
hour and an average alert lead time of 38 seconds. 
I. Introduction 
HE current U.S. air transportation system is expected to  be unable to support the projected demand for  air 
travel. One of the primary limitations is controller workload.  A combination of air- and ground-based 
automation is a potential solution to the limitation of airspace capacity due to controller workload. One area of 
research central to this goal is the automation of conflict detection and resolution functions.
1
 
Recently there has been considerable research directed towards a new concept for automated separation 
assurance, referred to as the Advanced Airspace Concept (AAC).
2-4 
The AAC provides two independent layers of 
separation assurance - a strategic layer and a tactical layer. The strategic layer focuses on mid-term conflicts (losses 
of separation) predicted to be from 2 to 20 minutes into the future. The tactical layer addresses short-term or 
imminent conflicts predicted to occur within approximately 2 minutes. A third layer of safety is provided by an 
independent airborne collision avoidance system such as TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System).
5
 
TCAS deals with potential collisions less than approximately 45 seconds away. The tactical layer, known as Tactical 
Separation Assured Flight Environment (TSAFE), is proposed as a backup system that duplicates a limited set of 
safety-critical functions of the strategic layer. TSAFE simplifies the problem of automated separation assurance and 
provides a safety net for the strategic layer. Most of the research to date has focused on en-route airspace. En-route 
prototypes of TSAFE have been developed and studied with the use of en-route operational error cases
 6-9
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attention on TSAFE conflict resolution has also appeared recently.
10-12
 TSAFE as an independent system to aid the 
controller for the near term has also been proposed.
8-11 
A high-level specification for Short Term Conflict Alert 
systems similar to TSAFE has also recently been released by EUROCONTROL.
13
 
The complexity of terminal airspace has proven difficult for tactical conflict detection systems. The contributing 
factors include the dense air traffic, frequent large turns, an incompletely specified flight plan, a complex set of 
separation standards, and the frequent necessity to operate aircraft purposely near the required separation standards. 
Conflict Alert,
14
 the legacy system that relies mainly on dead reckoning to predict aircraft trajectories, currently 
provides tactical alerts in terminal airspace. It is designed to determine if two aircraft are in dangerous proximity of 
each other rather than if they are going to lose legal separation by the separation standards. It is often inhibited or 
degraded in areas where frequent false alerts occur.
15
 Thus, Conflict Alert was not designed for the controller to 
maintain legal aircraft separation, and as such the separation standards for terminal airspace have not been adapted 
closely enough. On the other hand, the conflict detection algorithms in en-route TSAFE have not been designed to 
address the unique problems of terminal airspace. To the best of our knowledge, no report on direct application of 
the en-route algorithms to terminal airspace can be found in the literature, and there is no literature on tactical 
conflict detection algorithm that covers the whole terminal airspace and follows the separation standards.  
In this paper, a new conflict detection algorithm is proposed which uses a single analytic trajectory that takes 
into account available flight intent information and the current state of the aircraft. The trajectory consists of 
segments of straight lines and circular arcs that can be represented analytically. Apart from the flight plan, which 
can include a RNAV (Area Navigation) departure route, the flight intent information includes segments of nominal 
TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) routes, speed restrictions, and altitude clearances inferred from the 
recorded track data. A complex set of current, dynamic separation standards for terminal airspace, as documented in 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Order JO 7110.65S,
16
  is adapted to define losses of separation. The new 
algorithm is compared with an algorithm that imitates the dual-trajectory algorithm of en-route TSAFE
 9
 and another 
that imitates Conflict Alert. The comparison is through the analysis of false-alert rate and alert lead time with fast-
time simulation of recent real-world data of arrival and departure operations and 70 operational error cases from 
Dallas/Fort Worth TRACON. The results show that the new flight-intent algorithm yields a significantly reduced 
false-alert rate without much penalty in the alert lead time. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II presents a broad set of the standard FAA separation criteria 
used to define conflicts. Details about the tactical conflict detection algorithms are also presented.  Sec. III provides 
results and discussion from analysis of the alerting performance of the algorithms. A classification of false alerts in 
the analysis of real-world traffic data is discussed as well. Sec. IV presents conclusions. 
II. Conflict Detection 
An operational error usually refers to the failure of an air traffic controller to detect a conflict with sufficient lead 
time to resolve it before loss of separation occurs. A key technical means of reducing operational errors in the near 
term would be to provide timely alerts of impending conflicts to controllers. This paper will not address the 
graphical user interface to alert controllers but instead focuses on the detection problem. 
Conflict detection starts with predicting the trajectories of the flights involved. This relies on the aircraft’s 
current state information and knowledge of the intended route. The vertical and horizontal separations are calculated 
along the predicted trajectories starting with the current positions. A loss of separation is found when the predicted 
separations are less than the standard separation criteria within the look-ahead period. No separation buffers are used 
in this research since any such buffer is unnecessarily subjective. The standard separation criteria in terminal 
airspace are dynamic, as they depend on the specific encounter geometry and the types of aircraft involved. 
A. Separation Criteria 
FAA Order JO 7110.65S documents the required separation between aircraft.
16
 In the following subsections, the 
precise separation criteria used in this research are listed along with the assumptions made. 
1. General Separation Minima 
Aircraft in terminal airspace are generally required to maintain a separation of at least 3 nmi horizontally or 1000 
ft vertically.  When a pair of aircraft is in transition from terminal to en route airspace, en route separation minima of 
5 nmi and 1000 ft apply. An example as to when this criterion would be applied is when one of the aircraft is above 
the TRACON ceiling, which for DFW TRACON is at 17,000 ft. 
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2. Wake Separation Minima 
When a trailing aircraft operates horizontally within 2500 ft of the flight path of the leading aircraft over the 
surface of the Earth, the trailing aircraft is said to be directly behind the leading aircraft. The wake turbulence 
separation minima in Table 1 are required when an aircraft 
1) Operates directly behind and is either at the same altitude as, or within 1000 ft below, another aircraft. 
2) Follows another aircraft conducting an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach. 
Since it is impossible to tell 
based on the track data 
whether the aircraft are 
conducting ILS approaches, all 
approaches are treated as ILS 
approaches in this research. In 
addition, the aircraft must be 
ensured to be able to maintain 
the separation minima in Table 2 when the leading 
aircraft is over the runway threshold.  
When certain required conditions are satisfied, a 
reduced separation of 2.5 nmi is authorized. These 
required conditions are as follows: (a) the leading 
aircraft's weight class is the same as or less than the 
trailing aircraft; (b) both aircraft are established on 
the final approach course within 10 nmi of the 
runway threshold; (c) an average runway occupancy time of 50 seconds or less was documented; (d) Certified 
Tower Radar Displays (CTRDs) were operational and used for quick glance references by controllers. In this 
research, we assume that conditions (c) and (d) are satisfied whenever conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. Heavy and 
B757 (Boeing 757) aircraft are permitted to participate in this separation reduction as the trailing aircraft only. An 
aircraft is considered to be established on the final approach course (localizer) if it is within a given angular course 
width, measured from the localizer transmitter, which is typically 1000 ft away from the far end of the runway. The 
course width of a final approach course is tailored to provide 700 ft full scale at the threshold.
17
 A typical runway 
length of 9000 ft is assumed in this research, which corresponds to a course width of about 4 degrees. In a real 
system, the localizer dimensions for a given runway are available and can be input to the system. 
3. Other Separation Minima 
1) When two aircraft are on parallel dependent ILS approaches to runways with a center-line separation of at 
least 2500 ft but no more than 4300 ft, a minimum of 1.5 nmi is required.  
2) In the case of an arrival trailing a departure, a minimum of 2 nmi and 1000 ft must be maintained between 
the aircraft if the separation will increase to a minimum of 3 nmi within 1 minute after the takeoff.  
3) Between a VFR (Visual Flight Rules) aircraft and an IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) aircraft, the separation 
minima are 1.5 nmi and 500 ft. 
4. Exceptions 
There are exceptions to the above minimum separation requirements when diverging courses are involved. Two 
aircraft are said to be on SAME, CROSSING, or OPPOSITE courses if the angular difference between their courses 
is contained in the mathematical intervals [0, 45°), [45°, 135°], or (135°, 180°] respectively.
16
 There is no loss of 
separation if two aircraft are 
1) On SAME or CROSSING courses with their courses diverging by more than 15° and one aircraft has 
crossed the projected course of the other. 
2) On OPPOSITE courses and they have passed each other. 
3) Successive departing aircraft separated by more than 1 nmi. 
For successive departing aircraft, the standard criterion requires the courses to diverge by 15° or more. However, 
many successive departures appear not to follow this divergence requirement and further investigation is needed to 
clarify this. Thus, the diverging requirement is relaxed in this paper. 
Another exception case is when both aircraft are established on their independent final approach courses. In this 
case, there is no separation requirement. It is generally impossible to tell whether the runways are dependent or 
independent based on current track data. However, when their centerlines are separated by more than 4300 feet, they 
are used more often as independent runways. Thus, unless usage of dependent runways is stated explicitly, as in the 
operational error report, we assume that the runways are independent when their centerlines are separated by more 
Table 2  Wake separation for different weight classes at 
runway threshold 
Leading Aircraft  Heavy  B757  Heavy 
Trailing Aircraft  Heavy  Small  Small 
Sep. Minima, nmi  4  5  6 
 
 
 
Table 1  Wake separation for different weight classes in terminal airspace 
Leading Aircraft  Heavy B757 Heavy B757 
Trailing Aircraft  Heavy Large/B757/Heavy Small/Large/B757 Small 
Sep. Minima, nmi  4 4 5 5 
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than 4300 ft. In a real system, this can be input information. When the centerlines are separated by a distance within 
2500 ft and 4300 ft, dependent runways are expected and the 1.5-nmi criterion as described above is used.  
B. Flight-Intent Routes and Horizontal Conformance 
Horizontal conformance is defined in terms of an aircraft’s position relative to its flight intent route, which refers 
to the merging of its FAA flight-plan route and the nominal TRACON route segments. The FAA flight plan today 
generally does not have complete details from the meter fix to the runways. On the departure side, the RNAV 
departure route of the flight plan provides accurate enough waypoints from the departure runway to the meter fix. 
Nevertheless, the RNAV routes in the DFW TRACON are not available for every airport. 
Aircraft generally follow the same nominal paths that have some common flexibility in the TRACON. Past air 
traffic automation efforts have used these prescribed nominal TRACON paths from the meter fixes down to the 
runways.
18
 They are sometimes referred to as nominal 
interior routes (NIRs). An NIR for an aircraft is unique 
given the airspace configuration and the engine type, 
meter fix, airport, and assigned runway. A typical NIR is 
shown in Fig. 1 where the squares on the center line 
indicate waypoints. The last two waypoints in the final 
leg are the final approach fix (FAF) and runway 
threshold fix (RWY). Most arrival aircraft in DFW 
TRACON are observed to follow the NIRs except that a 
base extension or “trombone” is common. Thus, an NIR 
approximately describes the horizontal flight intent of an 
arrival aircraft in today's system. The flight-intent route 
of an aircraft merges its flight-plan route with its NIR.  
In this research, an aircraft is said to be in 
conformance or on-track if its cross-track distance to the 
center of the nominal interior route is within a 
conformance threshold; otherwise the aircraft is said to 
be out of conformance or off-track. Thus, as shown in 
Fig. 1, if an aircraft is within the shaded area defined by the conformance threshold, the aircraft is on-track. The 
value for the conformance threshold is taken to be 0.5 nmi throughout. Conformance is used in constructing the 
horizontal track of an aircraft and the conformance threshold is based on qualitative comparison of a large number 
of predicted and actual horizontal tracks. For simplicity, aircraft heading is not considered in defining the 
conformance. For the purpose of constructing horizontal tracks, heading becomes less important in the conformance 
definition in terminal airspace because of the shorter radar update cycle of 4.8 seconds as compared to 12 seconds in 
the en route.  The conformance threshold for final approach courses should be adjusted to optimize the detection of 
blunders in the final approach. 
C. Flight-Intent Trajectory 
A flight-intent (FI) trajectory algorithm is described which allows an aircraft trajectory to be constructed using 
segments of straight lines and circular arcs that can be represented analytically. Use is made of the flight-intent route 
and the current state information of the aircraft. A flyable horizontal track is first generated based on conformance 
and the flight-intent route. A ground speed profile is then created for the aircraft to fly along the track. Finally, an 
altitude profile is generated and superimposed on the horizontal trajectory. Additional flight intent data in the form 
of speed restrictions and altitude clearances may also be used.  
1. Horizontal Track 
The horizontal track for an FI trajectory assumes that, whenever possible, an aircraft attempts to conform to its 
flight intent route and other available intent information. Thus, when in conformance, it will stay in conformance; 
otherwise it will move along a straight line along its current course. However, the aircraft is assumed to be aware of 
its flight intent in the sense that, when possible, it joins smoothly back with the next segment in its FI route. So the 
aircraft flies along a horizontal track constructed using straight lines and circular arcs, which can be represented 
analytically, based on the following general rules:  
1) If the aircraft is on-track, capture the next waypoint in the flight intent route. 
2) If the aircraft is off-track, start with a straight line along its current course then, if possible, join the flight-
intent route when it is intercepted; otherwise continue along the straight line. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A static nominal interior route with a 
conformance region as indicated 
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5 
The radius of the circular-arc segments, assuming a coordinated turn, is estimated from the aircraft's current 
ground speed, V, and a bank angle,
B
 , by Bc gVr tan
2 , where g is the acceleration of gravity and B  = 30°. 
Since base extensions are common and turns onto the final are constrained, special rules apply to downwind-to-base 
and base-to-final turns. The rules are summarized as follows, with the numerical values being based on engineering 
experience: rules:  
1) Downwind-to-Base Rule: First, before a turn is detected, the aircraft is predicted to continue along its 
velocity vector (DR). Downwind-to-Base Rule: First, before a turn is detected, the aircraft is predicted to 
continue along its velocity vector. That is, a downwind-to-base turn will not commence until an actual turn 
of the aircraft has been detected. This rule is based on the observation that the base leg of the NIR is 
extended in most cases. The detection of a turn is defined as three consecutive course changes in the same 
direction (left or right). After a turn towards the base is detected, the actual turn radius is calculated based 
on the current rate of course change, , and the current ground speed by Vra  . If the current heading 
of the aircraft is more than 150 degrees from the final approach 
course, the aircraft is predicted to continue turning for 10 
seconds or about two radar update cycles with the current 
actual turn radius, ar ,  and then continue along a straight-line 
projection at the end of the turn. If the current course of the 
aircraft is within 150 degrees of the final approach course, the 
aircraft is assumed to continue turning with radius, ar ,  to a 
course perpendicular to the final approach course. If the turn is 
not possible because ar  is too large, the coordinated turn 
radius, cr , is tried. If the turn is still not possible, a straight 
line is used.  
2) Base-to-Final Rule: An aircraft approaching the final approach 
course with some angle is generally assumed to turn and start 
to intercept the final approach course at some minimum 
perpendicular distance, d, see Fig.2 for a typical turn scenario. 
Based on visual inspection of many actual trajectories, we take 
d = 2 nmi. Circular arcs and straight lines are used to construct 
the trajectories of interception. An interception angle, θ, of approximately 30° before the final approach fix 
is assumed. If an aircraft is already closer than 2 nmi to the final approach course, it is assumed to turn and 
intercept right away. If it is not possible to turn, it is assumed to fly along a straight line. 
As an illustration, Fig. 3 shows the FI 
trajectories predicted at each radar track 
position for an aircraft following a nominal 
interior route. The dashed line is the static 
NIR, which connects the waypoints 
represented by the squares. The final 
approach fix (FAF) and runway threshold 
(RWY) are also indicated. The base was 
extended about 9.5 nmi. The circles and 
diamonds are the actual radar track positions 
with the circles indicating on-track and the 
diamonds off-track. The solid lines are the FI 
predictions. The intersection between the 
downwind and the expected base legs are 
indicated by label A. The actual base and 
final turns are indicated by B and C, 
respectively. Notice that the FI trajectories 
turn only after proper turns have been 
detected at B instead of following the base 
turn of the NIR at A. Before the base turn at 
 
Figure 3. Sample ground track with predicted FI trajectories 
for an aircraft following a nominal interior route. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A typical interception of the 
final approach course 
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B is detected, the aircraft follows the downwind leg and continues along its course in a straight line since it is off-
track. Then, when the turn at B is detected while the course of the aircraft is still more than 150° from its final 
approach course, the aircraft turns 10 more seconds before continuing along a straight line. Once its course is less 
than 150° from the final approach course, the 
aircraft turns into the base, approaches and 
intercepts properly the final approach course. 
For comparison, Fig.4 shows the corresponding 
dead-reckoning (DR) predictions (straight lines 
along the aircraft courses) for the same aircraft. 
As can be seen, the FI trajectories provide more 
accurate predictions than the DR trajectories.                 
2. Ground Speed Profile 
A ground speed profile based on current 
ground speed and acceleration is generated for 
the aircraft to fly along the constructed 
horizontal track. Our experience from 
comparing the trajectory predictions with the 
actual TRACON tracks suggests that the ground 
speed changes significantly enough that it is 
necessary to model the acceleration. However, 
since the actual duration of deceleration of an 
aircraft is not known, the rate of the 
deceleration may be so large that the aircraft may be predicted to reduce its speed unrealistically to zero within the 
2-minute probe period. Thus, a lower limit for the ground speed is necessary, especially during base leg and final 
approach periods. Similarly, the acceleration of a departing flight may be so large that an upper bound on the ground 
speed may need to be imposed. In this paper, ground speed lower bounds near the final approach and runway 
threshold fixes are imposed, and an upper bound is imposed on certain departure flights. Other bounds may be added 
in the future. When a ground speed bound is imposed, the aircraft is projected to fly at that speed bound once it is 
reached. 
The lower bound on the ground speed near the final approach fix is set at 160 knots. The bound at the runway 
threshold is 130, 115, or 95 knots depending on whether the engine type of the aircraft is jet, turboprop, or piston, 
respectively. The ground speed upper bound for departure flights is 260 knots for flights below 6500 ft. These 
numbers are based on observations of a large set of flight data. The results are not sensitive to the precise values. 
Given the current ground speed, the length of the constructed trajectory, and the speed bound, a required 
acceleration may be calculated. In the case of a deceleration, if the magnitude of the required deceleration is larger 
than the current measured value, the required value will be used. Otherwise, current ground deceleration is used. 
Note that while wind effects are not explicitly taken into account, they are implicitly taken into account through 
modeling the ground acceleration.  
3. Altitude Profile 
The climb or descent of an aircraft is simply modeled in a 
three-phase altitude profile: an initial acceleration phase, a 
constant-rate phase, and a final deceleration phase. A vertical 
constant acceleration of is assumed for the initial and final 
phases. With this acceleration, it takes about 10 seconds for an 
aircraft to increase its climb rate by 2000 fpm. Fig. 5 illustrates 
the model of a three-phase climb. The following rules are used 
to determine the phase of a flight:  
1) When the vertical distance to the cleared altitudes of 
an aircraft is more than 200ft, and its climb or decent 
rate is more than 500 fpm, it is in the constant-rate 
phase.  
2) When the distance is more than 200 ft and the climb or 
decent rate is less than 500 fpm, it is in the 
acceleration phase. (It is not in a deceleration phase 
since the speed would have to be larger for a stopping 
distance of 200 ft.)  
 
 
Figure 5. A typical interception of the final 
approach course 
 
 
Figure 4. Sample ground track with predicted DR 
trajectories for an aircraft following a nominal interior route. 
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3) Otherwise the aircraft is in the deceleration phase. 
Note that the numbers above are adjustable and they appear reasonable when the predicted trajectory profiles are 
compared with many actual traffic trajectories. The conflict prediction results are not sensitive to the precise values. 
If an aircraft is in the constant-rate phase, its 
constant vertical rate is given by its current 
vertical rate. If an aircraft is in the initial 
acceleration phase, its vertical speed at the 
constant-rate phase is obtained by looking up the 
nominal climb or descent rate in the Base of 
Aircraft Data (BADA) from Eurocontrol.
19
 
While most altitude clearances are entered 
into the Host computer at each Air Route Traffic 
Control Center (ARTCC or Center),
20
 these 
clearances usually are only transmitted by voice 
in the TRACON without being entered into the 
TRACON’s ARTS or STARS computer. In the 
future, such cleared altitudes may be entered into 
the system, in which case the clearances would 
become available intent data for use in predicting 
the trajectory. To study the effects of temporary 
altitude clearances, we extract the location and 
duration of level segments from a recorded file of 
aircraft tracks and use them to generate simulated altitude clearances. The resulting cleared altitudes are referred to 
as Inferred Altitude Clearances (IACs) in this paper. By comparing the false-alert rates with and without the use of 
IACs, the importance of making them available can be addressed. 
A sample altitude profile that uses IACs is shown in Fig. 6, where the circles represent the actual altitude above 
mean sea level (MSL) and the solid lines are predictions from the altitude profile algorithm. As seen in the figure, 
the predicted trajectories level off at the inferred altitudes. Without the IACs, the predicted trajectories would have 
continued descending below the cleared altitudes. Inevitably, this could cause false alerts. 
D. Conflict Prediction Algorithms 
An algorithm using the flight-intent trajectory is proposed to predict potential conflicts of aircraft in the terminal 
airspace. The algorithm, referred to as flight-intent (FI) conflict prediction algorithm, starts with the calculation of 
the flight-intent trajectories of all aircraft. Each trajectory consists of straight lines, circular arcs, kinematic ground-
speed profile, and altitude profiles that can all be represented analytically. The positions of each pair of aircraft are 
then predicted and checked for any potential conflicts through the trajectories with an adjustable look-ahead period. 
When the horizontal track follows the flight-intent route, a look-ahead period of 2 minutes is used; otherwise a 1.5 
minute look-ahead period is used instead. 
As in en-route TSAFE and Conflict Alert, some heuristic methods are used to reduce false alerts caused by 
outlying track data as described below. 
1) Alert Filtering:  A 3-out-of-3 rule is applied if the predicted time to loss of separation (LOS) is larger than 
60 seconds. That is, a loss of separation must be predicted for three consecutive radar updates. Similarly, a 
2-out-of-2 rule is applied if the predicted time to LOS is between 30 and 60 seconds. A 1-out-of-1 rule (no 
repeat required) is applied if the predicted time to LOS is less than 30 seconds or if there exists an LOS 
prediction (not filtered by this rule) within the previous 25 seconds. The numbers used here are to suppress 
nuisance alerts due to outlying track positions, ground speeds, or vertical rates with proper consideration of 
the fact that current radar track update is 4.8 seconds. When the prediction time is below 30 seconds, it 
appears that the risk of delaying a critical alert due to filtering outweighs the benefit. The values should be 
made adjustable and further tuned in a real system.  
2) Altitude Rounding: The standard altitude rounding rule that is used in the Host computer at each Center is 
adopted here. The rule is that any aircraft flying nominally level within 200 ft of its cleared altitude is 
considered to be exactly at its cleared altitude for the purposes of separation requirements. 
3) Initial Track Filtering: For the first or second radar updates, the course is usually not accurate, so those 
data points are excluded from conflict detection. 
In general, the predicted states of a pair of aircraft at some look-ahead time determine whether a loss of 
separation shall be predicted. The situation is more complicated when wake turbulence is involved, since the track 
 
Figure 6. Sample altitude profiles with inferred altitude 
clearances. 
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8 
history is required to determine if the trailing aircraft is operating directly behind (within 2500 ft of the flight path 
of) the leading aircraft. Thus, a 3-minute track history of each aircraft is kept. To check if wake separation applies to 
a pair of in-trail aircraft, the cross-track position of the trailing aircraft with respect to the track history of the leading 
aircraft must first be located. Then, if the altitude of the trailing aircraft is within 1000 ft below that of the leading 
aircraft at the perpendicular cross-track position, wake separation applies. 
To see how well the FI algorithm performs, two other prediction algorithms are designed. One algorithm, called 
the dead-reckoning (DR) algorithm, imitates that of Conflict Alert and uses DR trajectories obtained from straight 
lines along the aircraft courses and current ground speeds and accelerations of the aircraft. Another algorithm, called 
the dual-trajectory algorithm, imitates that of en-route TSAFE and uses both the DR and FI trajectories. These two 
algorithms are summarized below. 
1) Dead-Reckoning Algorithm: DR trajectories are used to predict aircraft positions with a look-ahead period 
of 1.5 minutes. This reduced look-ahead period is chosen to reduce false alerts. When an aircraft is on its 
final approach course, determination of the separation criteria as described in Sec. II.A requires knowledge 
of the nominal interior route. Therefore, the nominal interior route is assumed to be known to the DR 
algorithm to determine separation criteria when the aircraft is on final approach. Otherwise, the DR 
algorithm would yield significantly more false alerts. 
2) Dual-Trajectory Algorithm: Both DR and FI trajectories are used with 1.5- and 2-minute look-ahead 
periods, respectively. Furthermore, a vertical uncertainty envelope is introduced which allows vertical rate 
to vary within 10 % of the constant rate in the constant-rate phase. Thus, a potential conflict is predicted 
when any of the four trajectory combinations, DR/DR, DR/FI. FI/DR, and FI/FI, between a pair of aircraft 
predicts one. 
III. Alerting Performance 
A prototype Terminal TSAFE system, built upon the test bed system in Ref. 12, has been developed that sets up 
a framework to incorporate different conflict detection and resolution algorithms in a fast-time simulation of aircraft 
traffic data. The input to the system is an archived data file containing radar tracking data, Mode C barometric 
altitude data, flight-plan route data, and altitude amendments. These input data are used to generate trajectories that 
are passed through the conflict detection algorithms to detect potential conflicts.  Aircraft trajectories and conflict 
information are then recorded.  
The FI conflict detection algorithm along with the DR and dual algorithms discussed in Sec. II.D were 
implemented in the prototype Terminal TSAFE system to evaluate and compare their performance in alerting the 
controller of potential conflicts. The results are discussed in the next two subsections. 
A. Alert Lead Times 
Alert lead time for predicting a loss of separation (LOS) is defined as the difference between the actual LOS time 
and the time of the first prediction. Thus, the larger the alert lead time the larger the predictive power of the system. 
1. Variety of Operational Errors 
The study of alert lead times is based on fast-time simulation of track data of 70 operational error cases from 
DFW TRACON during the period between January 2007 and April 2009. For each operational error case, a set of 
conflict plots for each detection algorithm was generated and examined along with the corresponding operational 
error report from the FAA. The operational errors covered a wide variety of situations as can be seen in Table 3. At 
least one aircraft was on final approach in 44 of the 70 cases. Fifteen cases involved aircraft coming from or going 
to different airports. Fifty-nine cases 
involved at least one arrival flight and 
17 cases involved at least one departure 
flight. Also, there were 15 cases that 
involved violations of wake separation, 
and 13 cases resulted in the execution 
of a missed approach. Note that these 
were losses of separation rather than 
near misses. At least two cases trigged 
a TCAS resolution advisory. 
2. A Sample Operational Error 
Figures 7 to 9 show various plots 
for one of the 70 operational error 
Table 3.  Characteristics of 70 operational errors 
No. of cases Characteristics 
44 One or both making final approaches 
15 To or from different airports 
4 Same airport arrival versus departure 
59 One or both arrival 
17 One or both departure 
15 Wake turbulence 
2 TCAS resolution advisory executed 
13 Missed approach resulted 
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cases. Fig. 7 shows several minutes of ground track data for two aircraft (AC1 and AC2) leading up to the LOS. 
Aircraft AC1, represented by the solid line, was an MD82 on a downwind leg. Aircraft AC2, represented by the 
dashed line, was an MD82 on a base leg. The circles are 3 nmi in diameter at the point of the first LOS. The 
asterisks are minute markers going back to three minutes before the first LOS. The squares and the grey lines of 
similar types connecting the squares represent the nominal interior route for each aircraft. Both aircraft are on 
extended base legs. The sharp turn to the right of AC2 results from a controller intervention. 
Fig. 8 shows several minutes of the altitude profiles leading up to the LOS. The zero reference time is at the first 
LOS, which corresponds to the circles on the ground-track plot. The altitudes are measured relative to MSL. AC1 
was descending to 7000 ft. AC2 was descending to 5000 ft but not as fast as the controller anticipated, causing the 
loss of separation. The descent of AC1 and the climb of AC2 a few seconds before the first LOS were responses to 
controller intervention.     
Fig. 9 shows a plot of the horizontal and vertical separations as the two flights lose separation. The origin of this 
plot represents the point of collision, and the lower left quadrant represents the region of insufficient separation. The 
discrete points represent the discrete radar samples at intervals of 4.8 seconds. The arrow indicates the evolving 
direction of the separation with time. The asterisk corresponds to the first LOS.                       
Fig. 10 shows the alerts generated from the dual conflict prediction algorithm. The time origin is the first-LOS 
reference time. Each alert marked with an “x” corresponds to a predicted conflict at a radar update. Alert types 1-4 
represent predictions using various combinations of FI and DR trajectories. In the case of the FI algorithm, there are 
only alert types of 0 and 1 while in the DR algorithm there are only alert types of 0 and 4. Alert type 0 represents the 
detection of the actual losses of separation. In the case of dual-trajectory algorithm, the alert lead time is the largest 
alert lead times from alert types 1 to 4. In the example of Fig. 10, the alert lead time is approximately 95 seconds, 
and the first predictions of LOS for the four non-zero alert types were atypically at the same time. 
 
Figure 7. Ground tracks for a sample operational 
error. 
 
Figure 8. Altitude profiles for a sample operational 
error. 
 
Figure 9. Two-dimensional separation for a sample 
operational error. 
 
Figure 10. Conflict detection results for a sample 
operational error. 
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3. Alert Cumulative Distribution Function 
The alert lead time for each of the 70 operational error 
cases was determined for each of the DR, FI, and dual 
conflict prediction algorithms. The resulting alert 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) is shown in Fig. 
11. The alert CDF provides the cumulative probability of 
an alert as a function of time relative to the first LOS. The 
alert lead time is simply the negative of the time relative to 
the first LOS. Thus, for the FI algorithm, 67% of the losses 
of separation were predicted more than 30 seconds in 
advance. Note that all three algorithms predicted 100% of 
the losses of separation by the time of first LOS. The 
average alert lead times for the DR, FI, and dual algorithms 
are, respectively, 38, 38, and 44 seconds before first LOS. 
These alert lead times should be compared with the fact 
that, among 66 out of the 70 cases, controllers either did 
not take any action or they acted after a loss of separation 
had already occurred. The alert CDF, as well as the 
average alert lead times, shows that there is no significant improvement of the FI algorithm over the DR algorithm 
in terms of alert lead time. However, there is a higher probability of detecting a loss of separation sooner for the dual 
algorithm. This is because the dual algorithm allows for a larger uncertainty in the probing trajectory of an aircraft. 
However, this more conservative approach will be shown in Sec. III.C to have a much larger false-alert rate.  
4. Operational Errors with Small Alert Lead Times 
For many operational errors, the alert lead times were small or even zero. In 15 of the 70 cases, all of the three 
algorithms predicted a loss of separation less than 15 seconds before the first actual loss of separation. Examination 
of these late-detection cases revealed the characteristics of the encounters that prevented the algorithms from 
detecting the LOS sooner. Among 8 of the 15 cases, the aircraft made an abrupt descent or climb maneuver due to a 
controller error that was not expected by the algorithms and was too quick for them to respond. Fig. 12 shows the 
ground tracks for an example of such late-detection encounters. Fig. 13 shows the altitude profiles for the same 
encounter with the altitudes again measured above MSL. Aircraft AC1 was a departure that had leveled off at 4000 
ft. Aircraft AC2 was an arrival that had leveled off at a cleared altitude of 5000 ft. Thus, while the two aircraft 
converged toward each other horizontally, they maintained the required standard separation of 1000 ft vertically. 
Following instructions from a controller, the pilot of AC2 started to descend it from 5000 ft while it was still 
converging with AC1 with their horizontal separation close to 3 nmi. An alert was generated by the FI algorithm 
about 14 seconds before the first LOS. Note that if a Terminal TSAFE system was available that allowed the 
controller to enter the descent command into the system before informing the pilot to descend via voice, an alert 
could have prevented the controller from descending AC2 until it had passed AC1, and the LOS would have been 
avoided. This illustrates that it is not possible to provide adequate look-ahead time in all cases without additional 
intent information. 
 
Figure 12. Ground tracks for a sample late-
detection operational error. 
 
Figure 11. Cumulative distribution function of 
alert time. 
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Figure 13. Altitude profiles for a sample late-
detection operational error. 
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The other seven cases with alert lead time less than 15 seconds are classified as follows. There were two cases in 
which a loss of separation was detected soon after the aircraft appeared in the radar system. There were four cases 
that involved “blunder” behavior that ignores the flight-intent route, such as abnormal sharp turns while the aircraft 
was on its base leg of the nominal interior route or flying away from the RNAV departure route. Finally, there was 
one case that involved an unexpected level off. Thus, the alert lead times for most of the late detections may be 
improved with the FI algorithm if notice of a maneuver is provided as soon as possible. Again this might be 
achieved through an interface for controllers to enter an intended descent or climb, a level off, or a turn.  
B. False Alerts 
False alerts distract controllers and are potentially dangerous since controllers must verify whether actual 
problems exist, diverting their attention from whatever genuine conflicts might be developing elsewhere in the 
airspace. In addition, when false alerts occur too often, they desensitize controllers to true alerts. However, the 
measures taken for reducing false alerts often decrease alert lead time or even cause missed alerts. To evaluate the 
conflict prediction algorithms further, we analyzed the false-alert rate for the algorithms using three sets of 30-
minute track data from DFW TRACON, each of which contains one documented operational error. When real-world 
TRACON data are analyzed, the classification of alerts is not straightforward. 
1. Classification of Alerts 
Aircraft pairs for which both flights were military or VFR were excluded in the analysis for simplicity since they 
may require different separation criteria. Also excluded were aircraft pairs for which either flight was a “pop-up” 
with unknown departure fix, destination fix, or both. Pop-up flights, examples of which include traffic helicopters 
and survey flights, require special treatment since the separation rules may be different. 
As in Ref. 9, although an aircraft pair can have an alert at each radar track update, successive alerts associated 
with the same aircraft pair will be counted as one alert. Thus, regardless of how many discrete alerts are actually 
generated for a pair of aircraft, they count as one alert.  
After discarding the aircraft pairs mentioned above, the remaining pairs for which alerts were generated can be 
classified into the usual true and false categories. In the absence of controller action, a true alert is followed by an 
actual LOS, while a false alert is not. However, when real-world data are used to analyze alerts, as is the case here, 
this becomes obscured since a controller or a pilot may intervene before a loss of separation occurs. To properly 
classify alerts into the usual true and false alert categories, we first classify the alerts objectively into LOS and non-
LOS alerts. An LOS alert is one that is followed by an actual loss of separation, and a non-LOS alert is not. The 
non-LOS alerts are then classified subjectively as either valid or invalid alerts as described later in this section. The 
invalid non-LOS alerts are further divided into leveloff related and non-leveloff related alerts. As seen later, the 
number of leveloff related invalid alerts are large and may be disturbing to the controller and thus, they are singled 
out. With this classification, true alerts then consist of LOS and valid non-LOS alerts, while false alerts consist of 
invalid non-LOS alerts, which include both the leveloff-related and non-leveloff-related alerts. Fig. 14 summarizes 
the alert classification scheme.  
The classification of alerts based on real-world data is difficult 
due to the nature of terminal operations (vectoring for separation).  
While aircraft should not be close together in an en route 
operation, they are purposely placed near the required separation, 
more so near their final approaches. Thus, the distinction between 
valid and invalid alerts becomes difficult since alerts beneficial to 
the controller can become nuisances when they occur too often. 
An example is a non-LOS alert generated before a leveloff when a 
loss of separation is predicted because the trajectory used for the 
prediction does not stop at the cleared altitude. While in many 
cases the leveloff might be anticipated by the controller, this could 
also be an unexpected maneuver to avoid a potential conflict. The 
alert may always be beneficial to the controller whichever 
scenario it was. However, since the unexpected scenario is not 
frequent and those leveloff-related alerts occur often, as is seen in the next section, they are put in the invalid 
category. Note that the classification has no effect on a real TSAFE system in the sense that if the cleared altitude is 
a part of the available intent, (e.g. when it is entered through an optional interface), the alert will not be present. 
Otherwise, it would be there to help the controller. More details on the non-LOS alerts are described next.   
 
Figure 14. Alert classification. 
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Valid non-LOS alerts 
Valid non-LOS alerts are those that are not subsequently 
followed by actual losses of separation because controllers or 
pilots intervene with maneuvers. The maneuvers can be 
vertical maneuvers involving a climb or descent with 
significant change in the vertical rate, horizontal maneuvers 
involving a non-procedural turn, or speed maneuvers involving 
a sharp change of speed. The non-procedural turns are those 
that do not correspond to the standard operational procedures. 
Standard turns include the downwind-to-base, base-to-final, or 
the RNAV departure turns. 
An example of a valid non-LOS alert is shown by the 
altitude profiles in Fig. 15, where the altitudes of two departure 
aircraft AC1 and AC2 are plotted. The solid and dashed lines 
represent the actual altitude profiles of AC1 and AC2, 
respectively. The thick lines of similar types are the predicted 
altitudes of the two aircraft and the small circles indicate the first predicted LOS. The arrow indicates that AC1 was 
assigned a cleared altitude at FL210 (flight level 21000 pressure altitude) by a controller. The vertical thin lines 
indicate the times at which the conflicts were predicted. During these predictions, AC1 was leveled at 10000 ft, AC2 
was climbing, and horizontally they were approaching 3 nmi separation (tracks are not shown). Their headings were 
at an angle of about 33º and they followed their flight plan routes closely. The time of the first prediction was about 
1.6 minutes away from the horizontal Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and the time to the predicted LOS was about 
1.5 minutes as indicated in Fig. 15. While the two aircraft got within 3 nmi horizontally, they maintained more than 
1000 ft separation vertically. An actual loss of separation was avoided due to the change in climb rate from about 
600 fpm to 2700 fpm as AC1 was issued the clearance to climb to FL210 after the prediction of the potential LOS. 
This is deemed a valid alert since the controller intervened after the prediction of LOS. 
Leveloff-related alerts 
Invalid leveloff-related non-LOS alerts are those that are not subsequently followed by actual losses of 
separation because the trajectories used to predict the conflicts are inaccurate for lack of flight intent data about the 
cleared altitudes. Three types of alerts in this category are possible:  
1) Alerts generated because the predicted trajectories do not level off at the cleared altitudes. 
2) Alerts generated while one of the aircraft is just leveling off but its vertical rate is not zero yet as a result of 
the lagging due to data smoothing. 
3) Alerts generated for aircraft that are supposedly in level flight, but outlying altitude points cannot be 
rounded to the cleared altitudes because altitude rounding cannot be applied without knowing the cleared 
altitudes as parts of the flight intent data.  
As will be seen in Sec. III.B.3 below, if these alerts are not 
properly isolated and avoided, their quantity can be large 
enough to become overwhelming to controllers.  
Many altitude clearances in terminal airspace are 
anticipated from the approach procedures or standard 
controller techniques. For example, it is typical that an 
aircraft needs to level off at 4000 ft or 5000 ft before turning 
onto the final approach courses. Thus, altitude clearances 
can be available to TSAFE ahead of time. However, this is 
not the case today since altitude clearances are only 
communicated via voice in the TRACON. In this research, 
inferred altitude clearances as discussed in Sec. II.C.3 are 
used to study the importance of including such flight-intent 
information.   In the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System, where altitude clearances will likely be explicitly 
entered by the controller, TSAFE may avoid many invalid 
leveloff-related alerts. In the near term, a controller interface 
could be added to enter altitude clearances optionally when 
workload permits. 
 
Figure 15. Altitude profiles for a pair of 
aircraft with a valid non-LOS alert. 
 
Figure 16. Altitude profiles for a pair of aircraft 
with an invalid leveloff-related alert. 
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An example of invalid leveloff-related non-LOS alerts is shown in Figs. 16, where the altitudes above MSL of 
aircraft AC1 and AC2 are plotted against the time relative to the horizontal closest appoint of approach. As in Fig. 
15, the solid and dashed lines are for AC1 and AC2 respectively and the thick lines of similar types are the predicted 
altitude profiles. The vertical thin lines indicate consecutive predictions of potential conflicts. AC1 was level at 
11000 ft while AC2 was climbing and intended to level at a cleared altitude of 10000 ft (not entered into the 
system). Horizontally both aircraft followed their flight plan route closely with their tracks being about to cross each 
other. Thus, a horizontal separation less than 3 nmi was unavoidable. However, for lack of the flight intent of the 
altitude clearance at 10000 ft, AC2 was predicted to climb through that altitude, yielding a predicted conflict as 
indicated by the small circles in Fig. 16.  
Non-leveloff-related alerts 
Invalid non-leveloff-related non-LOS alerts are 
technically invalid alerts that are not leveloff related. 
They are not subsequently followed by actual losses of 
separation because the prediction trajectories fail to 
model the standard operation procedures or there are 
still unfiltered outlying track data. 
An example of an invalid non-leveloff-related alert 
is shown in Fig. 17, where the tracks of aircraft AC1 
and AC2 are plotted. The solid and dashed lines 
correspond to the actual tracks of aircraft AC1 and 
AC2. The grey lines of similar types are the flight-
intent (nominal interior) routes. The dark solid and 
dashed lines are predicted trajectories using the DR 
algorithm. The dark circles of 3 nmi in diameter 
indicate the first prediction of a potential LOS while 
the thin circles indicate the actual CPA. Because the 
aircraft followed the nominal interior routes instead of 
the DR trajectories, the predicted LOS never materialized. Note that alerts generated by the DR and dual-trajectory 
algorithms, designed for comparison with the FI algorithm, were classified by the same scheme. 
2. False Alerts 
Three 30-minute data sets 
of recent arrival and departure 
operations at DFW TRACON 
are used for false-alert 
analysis. These data sets are 
summarized in Table 4 with 
each set containing one 
documented operational error. 
The average aircraft count in the data set is the average number of aircraft in the TRACON at a given time, which 
measures how busy the TRACON was. The number of LOS alerts for each data set generated based on the 
separation criteria described in Sec. II.A is also presented. This number is the same for all of the algorithms, in 
agreement with the earlier result that there are no missed alerts for each algorithm. It is interesting also to note that 
the higher the average traffic density in the TRACON, the higher the number of LOS alerts. 
Excluding the 
alerts corresponding 
to the documented 
operational errors, a 
total of 21 LOS 
alerts for the three 
sets together were 
found. Table 5 shows 
the characteristics of 
these LOS alerts that 
were not reported as 
operational errors. 
Table 4 Data sets for false alert analysis 
Data  Date Time Avg. Aircraft Count No. of LOS 
Set I  06/05/2008 15:07—15:37 40 11 
Set II  03/18/2009 20:48—21:18 51 12 
Set III  04/12/2009 14:31—15:01 26 1 
 
 
Table 5 Characteristics of LOS alerts not reported as operational errors 
No. of cases Characteristics 
13 LOS occurred when one or both of the aircraft on parallel final 
approaches were not established on the localizer. 
1 LOS occurred because one of the aircraft on parallel final approaches 
stepped to a close-by “departure” runway (which is actually legal). 
3 LOS occurred due to violation of wake turbulence separation on the 
same runway. 
4 Other violations of the separation standards between two arrival flights.  
 
 
 
Figure 17. Ground tracks for a pair of aircraft with 
an invalid non-leveloff-related alert. 
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Most of them involved small violations of the separation standards when one or both aircraft was turning on the final 
approach. Inspection of the weather conditions and radar tracks suggests that the associated aircraft were likely 
conducting visual approaches and thus, these LOS alerts were likely not actual operational errors. 
Table 6 shows the number of non-LOS alerts per hour of different types generated from the FI, DR, and dual-
trajectory detection algorithms with or without the use of inferred altitude clearances (IACs). The types of invalid 
alerts are LR for leveloff related and NLR for non-leveloff related. The results can be summarized as follows: 
1) Apart from the FI algorithm with IAC, the number of valid alerts is small compared to the number of false 
(invalid) alerts. 
2) Use of the IACs removes the leveloff-related false alerts. 
3) The number of false (invalid) alerts for the FI algorithm is significantly less.   
The difference in false-alert rates for different algorithms can also be seen in the chart shown in Fig. 18.  The 
effect of using inferred altitude clearances is also shown. Compared with the dual algorithm, the false-alert rates for 
the DR and FI algorithms reduce by 40% and 61%, respectively, without the use of the IAC in the algorithms. The 
corresponding reductions become 34% and 93%, respectively, with the use of the IAC in the algorithms.  
The total number of false alerts for the FI algorithm 
with inferred altitude clearances for the three data sets is 
three. One of them resulted from some outlying data 
points that were not filtered out and involved a VFR 
flight. The other two appeared to result from inadequate 
modeling of the standard operational procedures. 
The significant reduction of false alerts from the dual 
to the FI algorithm and as a result of including IAC 
indicates that the use of nominal interior routes, RNAV 
departure routes, and inferred altitude clearances remove 
a majority of the false alerts. The DR algorithm generates 
considerably more false alerts than the FI algorithm 
because it does not take into account the standard 
operational procedures. The dual algorithm generates 
significantly more false alerts as compared to the DR 
algorithm because it includes false alerts generated by both DR and FI trajectory algorithms. The altitude envelopes 
used in the dual algorithm also contribute to the higher false alert rate. The leveloff-related false alerts are 
completely removed by introducing the inferred altitude clearances. The removal of the false alerts reduces the false-
alert rate to a manageable level. These results show clearly the importance of including some additional intent 
information for short term conflict prediction in the TRACON. 
IV. Conclusions 
A new tactical conflict detection flight-intent algorithm for terminal airspace has been studied. The FI algorithm 
uses a single analytic trajectory that is based on available flight intent and current state information of the aircraft 
with alerts determined by the standard separation criteria of the FAA in terminal airspace. The flight intent 
information includes the flight plan, part of which is the RNAV departure route, the nominal interior route, the 
inferred altitude clearances, and some ground-speed bounds.  The FI algorithm is compared with a dual algorithm 
that imitates the en-route TSAFE algorithm and a DR (dead-reckoning) algorithm that imitates Conflict Alert. The 
comparison is done through analysis of the false-alert rates and alert lead times from fast-time simulation of track 
data of three sets of departure and arrival operations and 70 operational error cases from DFW TRACON during the 
period between January 2007 and April 2009. The FI algorithm shows significantly reduced false alerts without 
much degradation of the alert lead time. The false-alert rate for the FI algorithm was reduced to two alerts per hour, 
Table 6  Number of non-LOS alerts per hour of different types for different algorithms 
 FI  DR  Dual 
 
Valid  Invalid Valid  Invalid Valid  Invalid 
LR NLR LR NLR LR NLR 
With IAC 7.3  0 2.0  5.3  0 19  8.7  0 29 
No IAC 6.0  18 4.7  4.0  19 16 10  25 33 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. False-alert rates for different detection 
algorithms. 
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and the alert lead time average over 70 actual TRACON operational errors was 38 seconds. Smoother track data and 
better flight intent data available in the future would only improve the results. 
While the false-alert rate may be at a manageable level, more extensive tests with broader data from other 
facilities, as well as human-in-the-loop simulation experiments, are still needed. It is also good to have a direct 
comparison between the results of terminal TSAFE and Conflict Alert. Unfortunately such comparison is not 
straightforward since, among other things, the separation criteria are quite different, and Conflict Alert is often 
inhibited in areas of frequent false alerts. Work in these areas is in progress. It appears that altitude clearances play 
an important role as additional flight intent information for terminal TSAFE. Further research on how to obtain this 
information efficiently is needed.  
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